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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to analyze, summarize, and categorize the
published Texas Supreme Court mandamus opinions delivered during the
survey period of January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2013. During that
survey period, the supreme court issued six published opinions involving
mandamus relief. Four of those opinions involved relators seeking relief based
on a claimed abuse of discretion by a lower court and no adequate remedy by
appeal. 1 In the remaining two opinions, the realtors sought mandamus relief
∗ B.S.B.A., Drake University; J.D., University of Missouri. Justice, Fifth District Court of
Appeals of Texas. Prior to joining the bench, Justice Lang was a partner in the Dallas office of
Gardere Wynne Sewell L.L.P. Justice Lang clerked for the Hon. Fred L. Henley of the Supreme
Court of Missouri from May 1972 to May 1973.
** B.S., Arizona State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law. Staff Attorney, Fifth District Court of Appeals of Texas.
1. See In re Blevins, No. 12-0636, 2013 WL 5878910 (Tex. Nov. 1, 2013) (orig. proceeding);
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respecting actions of courts or public officials pursuant to statutes or rules
specifically providing for such relief. 2
II. BACKGROUND
A. MANDAMUS FUNDAMENTALS
Texas appellate courts’ statutory jurisdiction over writs of mandamus is
rooted in the Texas Constitution and the Texas Government Code. 3 The
supreme court and the courts of appeals have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus: (1) to enforce their jurisdiction and (2) against judges of
certain courts. 4 Further, the supreme court may issue writs of mandamus against
the courts of appeals and any officer of state government except the governor,
the court of criminal appeals, or a judge of the court of criminal appeals. 5
Additionally, a number of statutes and rules provide for mandamus review
within specific parameters.6
Unless mandamus review is specifically provided for by statute or rule,
mandamus relief generally requires a showing of: (1) a clear abuse of discretion
and (2) “no adequate remedy by appeal.” 7 “A trial court clearly abuses its
discretion if ‘it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to
a clear and prejudicial error of law.’” 8 The determination of whether a remedy
by appeal is adequate is not a “formulaic one,” but rather is “practical and
prudential” and “resists categorization.” 9
Mandamus proceedings in both the supreme court and the courts of appeals
are governed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52. 10 Lack of adherence to
the provisions of Rule 52 may result in denial of relief. 11 Further, if the supreme
In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
407 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re Office of the Attorney Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623
(Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
2. See In re Blair, 408 S.W.3d 843 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re Nalle Plastics Family
Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
3. See TEX. CONST. ART. V, §§ 1, 3, 6; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 22.002, 22.221 (West
2004 & Supp. 2013).
4. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 22.002, 22.221.
5. Id. § 22.002.
6. For example, mandamus relief may be proper respecting the state comptroller’s denial of a
former prisoner’s claim for compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment, see TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.051(e) (West 2011) (following comptroller’s denial of application
for compensation for wrongful imprisonment, claimant may bring action for mandamus relief); a
duty relating to an election, see TEX. ELEC. CODE § 273.061 (West 2010) (“The supreme court or a
court of appeals may issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty imposed by
law in connection with the holding of an election or a political party convention, regardless of
whether the person responsible for performing the duty is a public officer.”); or review of a court of
appeals’ ruling on a motion challenging a trial court’s determination of the amount of security
required to supersede a judgment, see TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a).
7. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
8. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Johnson v.
Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding)).
9. See In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136.
10. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.
11. Id. Bases on which relief may be denied include, inter alia, (1) defects of form in the
petition (see In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding)); In re
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court and a court of appeals have concurrent jurisdiction in a mandamus
matter, the petition must first be presented to the court of appeals, unless there
is a compelling reason not to do so. 12
B. RECENT MANDAMUS STATISTICS
During the supreme court’s 2013 fiscal year, extending from September 1,
2012, to August 31, 2013, 219 new petitions for writ of mandamus were filed in
the supreme court and dispositions were rendered in 222 cases. 13 The petition
for writ of mandamus was denied in 175, or 78.8%, of those dispositions, and
was conditionally granted in five, or 2.25% of those dispositions.14 These
statistics show that while the number of new mandamus petitions filed in the
supreme court has not changed significantly in the last few years, 15 the
percentage of petitions conditionally granted continues to decline. 16 Further,
these numbers indicate mandamus remains an extraordinary and limited
remedy. 17
Oral argument was heard by the supreme court in all six of the cases
addressed in this article. In four of those six cases, the writ was conditionally
granted. 18 In one of the remaining two cases, the petition for writ of mandamus
was denied; 19 in the other, the mandamus proceeding was abated pending
specified proceedings in the trial court. 20
Amir-Sharif, No. 07-11-00294-CV, 2011 WL 3568940, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 15, 2011,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); (2) failure to properly authenticate evidence (see In re Cullar, 320
S.W.3d 560, 567–68 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding)); In re Vasquez, No. 08-12-00267CV, 2012 WL 4714492, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 3, 2012, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); and
(3) lack of a complete record (see In re Le, 335 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2011, orig. proceeding)); In re Barnhill, No. 12-11-00052-CV, 2011 WL 1532352, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Tyler Apr. 20, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
12. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e). For example, election cases requiring a speedy, final resolution and
cases presenting issues of statewide importance have met the “compelling reasons” standard. See In
re Univ. Interscholastic League, 20 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. 2000).
13. See
Supreme Court Activity: FY 2008–2013,
TEX. COURTS ONLINE,
www.txcourts.gov/media/652335/sc-Activity-2014.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2014). Dispositions for
a given fiscal year can include cases pending at the start of the fiscal year and therefore can exceed
the number of new cases added.
14. See id. Cases otherwise disposed of were generally dismissed or abated.
15. See
Supreme Court Activity: FY 2008–2012,
TEX. COURTS ONLINE,
www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_documents/JudicialInformation/pubs/AR2012/SC/2-scactivity(2).pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). For the 2012 fiscal year, that number was 214. For the
2013 fiscal year, the number of new petitions for writ of mandamus filed in the supreme court was
211.
See
Supreme
Court
Activity:
FY
2009–2013,
TEX. COURTS ONLINE,
www.txcourts.gov/media/449754/2-SC-Activity-2013.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). See id.
16. See id. The percentage of petitions for writ of mandamus conditionally granted during the
2011 fiscal year was 8.55% and the percentage conditionally granted during the 2012 fiscal year was
6.3%.
17. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);
In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. 2009) (orig.
proceeding).
18. See In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 447 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re Office of the Attorney
Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’Ship, 406
S.W.3d 168, 169 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
19. See In re Blair, 408 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
20. See In re Blevins, No. 12-0636, 2013 WL 5878910, at *3 (Tex. Nov. 1, 2013) (orig.
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III. MANDAMUS RELIEF TO CORRECT CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHERE NO ADEQUATE REMEDY BY APPEAL
This section focuses on the four supreme court decisions rendered during the
survey period involving the availability of mandamus relief to correct a clear
abuse of discretion by a lower court when there is no adequate remedy by
appeal. 21 Further, this section specifically examines the supreme court’s
treatment of the element of no adequate remedy by appeal.
A. CASE SUMMARIES
1. Mandamus and Family Law Matters
In re Blevins22 involved an original proceeding arising from an order in a Suit
Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR). In 2010, the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) placed siblings
R.M.R. and A.L.R. in foster care with the relator, Melissa Blevins, and her
husband. In August 2011, the trial judge signed an order in the SAPCR that: (1)
contained findings that appointment of the children’s father (Father) as
managing conservator “would not be in the best interests of the children;” and
(2) “appointed the Department as Permanent Managing Conservator and Father
as Possessory Conservator.” 23 “Father’s possession of and access to the children
was limited to supervised visitation.” 24 Blevins intervened in December 2011,
requesting that she be appointed sole managing conservator. Following an April
2012 hearing, the trial court signed an order stating the children were to be
placed with Father “in accordance with the prior order of this Court.” 25
However, no prior order of the trial court placed the children with Father. 26
Subsequently, the trial judge recused from the case and a replacement judge was
assigned. Blevins filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme
Court, requesting that the current trial judge be directed to vacate the April
2012 order placing the children with Father.27 The supreme court observed that
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2 provides that “in an original proceeding
where the judge who signed the order at issue has ‘cease[d] to hold office,’ an
appellate court ‘must abate the proceeding to allow the successor to reconsider
the original party’s decision.’” 28 However, the supreme court stated that the
courts of appeals were split as to whether Rule 7.2 applies in cases where “the
trial judge who signed the order being attacked in the case has not ceased to
hold office, but has only recused from further participation in the case.” 29
proceeding).
21. See In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135–36. The party seeking mandamus relief has the
burden to establish both of these requirements. Id.; see also In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151
(Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (per curium).
22. In re Blevins, 2013 WL 5878910, at *1.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Specifically, some courts of appeals had denied mandamus petitions under such
circumstances because “it ‘would be premature’ to compel the successor judge to
take any action before having an opportunity to review the relator’s
complaint,” 30 while others had abated the mandamus proceeding and instructed
the successor judge to prepare and send back his ruling on the underlying cause,
thus affording the successor judge “an opportunity to rule on the matter being
challenged.” 31 The supreme court concluded that “under circumstances such as
those before us, appellate courts should either deny the petition for mandamus .
. . or abate the proceedings pending consideration of the challenged order by the
new trial judge.” 32 Further, the supreme court stated that “[b]ecause mandamus
is a discretionary writ, the appellate court involved should exercise discretion to
determine which of the two approaches affords the better and more efficient
manner of resolving the dispute.” 33 The supreme court reasoned that in the case
before it, the “better and more efficient approach” would be to abate the
proceedings. 34 Accordingly, the supreme court did so and directed the trial court
assigned to the case to “take whatever actions and hold whatever hearings it
determines are necessary” for it to reconsider the April 2012 order and the
matters underlying it. 35 Additionally, the supreme court stated it did not intend
to limit the trial court to considering only the evidence on which the April 2012
order was based. 36
In the case of In re Lee, 37 relator Stephanie Lee and real party in interest
Benjamin Redus were the joint managing conservators of their minor daughter.
Under a 2007 order adjudicating parentage, Stephanie was granted the exclusive
right to designate the child’s primary residence. Subsequently, Benjamin
petitioned the trial court to modify that order. 38 After a pretrial mediation at
which both parties were represented by counsel, the parties executed a mediated
settlement agreement (MSA) modifying the 2007 order. The MSA: (1) gave
Benjamin “the exclusive right to establish the child’s primary residence;” (2) gave
Stephanie “periodic access to and possession of the child;” and (3) included a
restriction enjoining Stephanie’s husband, Scott Lee, “from being within five
miles [of the child]” at all times. 39 After the MSA was executed, Benjamin
appeared before an associate judge to prove up the MSA. During his testimony
in support of the MSA, Benjamin testified Scott: (1) was a registered sex
offender; (2) “violated conditions of his probation with [Benjamin’s] daughter in
th[e] house;” and (3) “sle[pt] naked in bed with [Benjamin’s] daughter between
[Scott and Stephanie].” 40 Based on that testimony, the associate judge refused to
30. Id. (quoting In re Toups Law Firm, No. 10-10-00226-CV, 2010 WL 3911420, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Waco Oct. 6, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)).
31. Id. (citing In re Gonzales, 391 S.W.3d 251, 252 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, orig.
proceeding)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at *3.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 447 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 448.

106

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 1

render judgment on the MSA. Following that hearing, Stephanie filed a motion
to render judgment on the MSA.41 Additionally, “Benjamin filed a written
objection withdrawing his consent to the MSA, arguing that it was not in the
best interest of the child.” 42 The trial court concluded “the MSA was not in the
best interest of the child and denied Stephanie’s motion to enter judgment.” 43
Stephanie sought a writ of mandamus in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in
Houston, arguing “the trial court lacked discretion to refuse judgment based on
the best interest determination.” 44 The court of appeals denied the petition for
writ of mandamus, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
“refusing to enter judgment on a mediated settlement agreement that is not in
the child’s best interest.” 45 Stephanie then sought mandamus relief in the
supreme court. The supreme court observed in a footnote that mandamus relief
is generally “available to remedy a trial court’s erroneous refusal to enter
judgment on an MSA,” and “[i]n a child-related dispute, the inadequacy of the
appellate remedy in the context of refusal to enforce a settlement agreement is
even more pronounced because the significant benefits to the family in
peaceably resolving the dispute through mediation are lost.” 46 The supreme
court stated in part:
While Texas courts have numerous tools at their disposal to safeguard
children’s welfare, the Legislature has clearly directed that, subject to a very
narrow exception involving family violence, denial of a motion to enter
judgment on an MSA based on a best interest determination, where that
MSA meets the statutory requirements of section 153.0071(d) of the Texas
Family Code, is not one of those tools.47
Finally, the supreme court observed that the parties admitted that the family
violence exception provided by the Legislature is not applicable in this case, and
concluded the MSA complied with section 153.0071(d). 48 Accordingly, the
supreme court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by denying the
motion to render judgment on the MSA and conditionally granted mandamus
relief. 49
In the case of In re the Office of the Attorney General, 50 Noble Ezukanma, M.D.
(Father) was ordered by the trial court to pay $5,400 each month to Njideke
Lawreta Ezukanma (Mother) for the support of their six children. As of June 9,
2008, Father had accumulated an arrearage of $23,044.78. 51 In June 2008, the
Tarrant County Domestic Relations Office filed a motion to enforce the support
order, specifically alleging the total outstanding arrearage, asserting six violations
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 450 n.7.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 461.
In re Office of the Attorney Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 625 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
Id.
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of the support order, and requesting Father be held in contempt for each of the
six violations. 52 In late June 2008, Father paid the entire pled arrearage in one
payment. However, by the time a hearing was held on the motion in February
2009, Father had accumulated a new arrearage of $28,656.56. The trial court
rendered a money judgment for that amount and held Father in contempt for
the failure to make timely child support payments that were due under the
support order prior to June 9, 2008. 53
Father sought mandamus relief in the Second Court of Appeals in Fort
Worth, arguing that the Texas Family Code “precluded a finding of contempt by
the trial court.” 54 In support of that argument, Father cited Texas Family Code
section 157.162(d), which provides in part that “[t]he court may not find a
respondent in contempt of court for failure to pay child support if the
respondent appears at the hearing with . . . evidence . . . showing that the
respondent is current in the payment of child support as ordered by the
court.” 55 Father contended this “provision prohibits a finding of contempt for
missed payments alleged in the motion to enforce that, though untimely under
the support order, had been satisfied prior to the hearing.” 56 The court of
appeals agreed and ordered the trial court to vacate its contempt order. 57 Then,
Mother and the Office of the Attorney General petitioned the supreme court for
mandamus relief, seeking reinstatement of the trial court’s contempt order.
After a discussion of contempt as a child support enforcement mechanism and
an analysis of the language of section 157.162(d), the supreme court concluded
that the section operates to “purge a respondent from contempt” only if the
respondent “is current on all child support obligations at the time of the
enforcement hearing, not just those pled in the motion to enforce.” 58 Therefore,
the supreme court concluded, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
holding Father in contempt. 59 The supreme court conditionally granted a writ of
mandamus and ordered the court of appeals to “vacate its judgment, thereby
reinstating the trial court’s contempt order.” 60
2. Mandamus and Granting of New Trial
In re Toyota Motor Sales61 addressed issues of whether an appellate court may:
(1) conduct a merits review of the bases for a new trial stated in an order
granting a new trial after a trial court has set aside a jury verdict; and (2) grant
mandamus relief if the record does not support the trial court’s rationale for
52. Id.
53. Id. at 626. In the contempt order, the trial court sentenced Father to 174 days in jail to be
served on the second and fourth weekends of every month.
54. Id. Because Father was imprisoned only on certain weekends, he sought both habeas
corpus and mandamus relief from the trial court’s contempt order. Only the mandamus relief is
addressed here.
55. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.162(d) (West 2012)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 628, 632 (emphasis original).
59. Id. at 632.
60. Id.
61. In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Tex. 2013) (orig.
proceeding).
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ordering a new trial. 62 Following Richard King’s death resulting from being
ejected from his vehicle during an accident, his family (family) filed suit against
the vehicle manufacturer and dealership (collectively, Toyota) alleging strict
products liability, negligence, wrongful death, and survivorship claims. 63
According to the family, “King was wearing his seat belt at the time of the
accident,” and the vehicle’s allegedly defective seat belt system caused King’s
ejection from the vehicle and his subsequent death. 64 In a videotaped pretrial
deposition, Justin Coon, the state trooper who responded to the accident
emergency call and investigated the scene, testified that based upon his
observations of the seat belt at the scene, he believed King was not wearing the
seat belt at the time of the “rollover” accident. 65 The trial court granted two
motions in limine filed by the family to bar “[a]ny testimony . . . that [King] was
not wearing his seat belt . . . before or during the [ac]cident.” 66 During trial,
Toyota’s counsel offered a redacted version of Coon’s testimony that excluded
reference to his view that King had not used the seat belt. However, the family’s
counsel expressly requested that redacted testimony be included based on
“optional completeness.” 67 Toyota’s counsel noted to the trial court that the
testimony was excluded pursuant to the motion in limine, but the trial court did
not exclude it.68 Later, the excluded statement was offered as part of the
testimony of Toyota’s expert without objection by the family’s counsel. 69 Finally,
in jury argument, Toyota’s counsel read Coon’s testimony, the family’s counsel
objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. 70 The family’s counsel,
however, made no motion to strike nor a request for a curative instruction. 71
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Toyota. 72
The family filed a motion for new trial, contending “Toyota’s counsel had
violated the trial court’s limine rulings by reading, during closing argument,” the
excluded portion of Coon’s deposition. 73 Toyota argued the family’s attorney
violated the limine rulings by offering the evidence based on “optional
completeness” prior to closing argument, and therefore Toyota “had every right
to make closing arguments regarding evidence already in the record.” 74 The trial
court granted the family’s motion for new trial on two grounds: (1) “in the
interest of justice” because Toyota had “violated the limine order” and
“purported to present evidence outside the record;” and (2) “to sanction Toyota
for violating the limine order, because a limiting instruction could not eliminate

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 750–51.
Id.
Id. at 751–52.
Id. at 753–54.
Id. at 754.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the harm.” 75
Toyota filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Eighth Court of Appeals
in El Paso, which denied relief. 76 The court of appeals concluded there was no
question the trial court’s order satisfied the specificity requirements for new trial
orders established by the supreme court in In re Columbia, 77 and “rejected the
notion that ‘Columbia supports further review of the merits of the grounds
specified.’” 78 Subsequently, Toyota filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the
supreme court. The supreme court stated that the trial court’s order comported
with established “procedural ‘form’ requirements” and satisfied, facially, the
requirement that “the reasons listed (if accurate) would have been ‘legally
appropriate’ grounds for new trial, and are ‘specific enough’ that they are not
simply pro forma.” 79 However, the supreme court concluded, “[i]f, despite
conformity with the procedural requirements of our precedent, a trial court’s
articulated reasons are not supported by the underlying record, the new trial
order cannot stand.” 80 After a lengthy discussion and analysis of the trial record,
the supreme court concluded the record “squarely conflicts with the trial judge’s
expressed reasons for granting a new trial,” and “does not support the new trial
order.” 81 Specifically, the supreme court stated:
The trial court’s pretrial limine rulings prevented Toyota from introducing
the evidence, and the record—specifically, the redacted deposition Toyota
offered—reflects Toyota’s compliance with those rulings. After the Kings’
attorney read the testimony into evidence, and after Toyota’s counsel
repeated the excerpt subsequently, the parties sought clarification from the
trial court, who repeatedly stated that the record would reflect what was in
evidence. The trial court did not instruct Toyota not to mention Coon’s
statement during closing; rather she warned that “appropriate sanctions
[would] be issued to either party if they argue outside the record.” (Emphasis
added). We agree with Toyota that it did not violate the trial court’s rulings
by referencing Officer Coon’s deposition in closing. 82
Additionally, the supreme court reasoned that, in light of its conclusion that
Toyota’s reference to the testimony in question during closing argument was
appropriate, the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning Toyota for that
conduct. 83 The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief and
ordered the trial court to withdraw its order and render judgment on the
verdict.84

75. Id. at 754–55.
76. Id. at 755.
77. See In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex.
209) (orig. proceeding).
78. In re Toyota Motor Sales, 407 S.W.3d at 755 (emphasis original).
79. Id. at 759.
80. Id. at 758.
81. Id. at 759–60.
82. Id. at 761.
83. Id. at 762.
84. Id.
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B. TREATMENT OF THE “ADEQUACY” REQUIREMENT
Only one of the four cases described above, In re Lee, specifically addressed
the adequacy of an appellate remedy. 85 However, in In re Blevins, the supreme
court considered courts of appeals’ observations that where the trial judge who
signed the order being attacked has recused from further participation in the
case, “it ‘would be premature’ to compel the successor judge to take any action
before having an opportunity to review the relator’s complaint,” and abatement
would afford the successor judge “an opportunity to rule on the matter being
challenged.” 86 The supreme court’s conclusion in In re Blevins that, under such
circumstances, “appellate courts should either deny the petition for mandamus .
. . or abate the proceedings pending consideration of the challenged order by the
new trial judge,” essentially precluded any analysis as to the adequacy of an
appellate remedy.87 Further, in the remaining two cases, the supreme court cited
prior opinions that involved similar fact situations and discussed the adequacy
of an appellate remedy in such situations. 88
These cases are consistent with the supreme court’s various approaches to
addressing the adequacy requirement in prior mandamus cases, 89 indicating no
change in the supreme court’s treatment of this requirement. The chart below
sets out the supreme court’s approaches relative to the subject matter of the four
cases.

85. See In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 450 n.7 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding) (“In a child-related
dispute, the inadequacy of the appellate remedy in the context of refusal to enforce a settlement
agreement is even more pronounced because the significant benefits to the family in peaceably
resolving the dispute through mediation are lost.”).
86. In re Blevins, No. 12-0636, 2013 WL 5878910, at *2 (Tex. Nov. 1, 2013) (orig.
proceeding).
87. Id.
88. See In re Toyota Motor Sales, 407 S.W.3d at 755–56 (citing In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las
Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209–10 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (potential
availability of review of new trial order following second trial was not adequate appellate remedy for
party seeking to challenge order granting new trial because (1) if party suffered unfavorable verdict
in second trial, “it could not obtain reversal unless it convinced an appellate court that the granting
of the new trial was error and that the error either prevented [the party] from properly presenting
its case on appeal or probably caused entry of an improper judgment” and (2) “even if an
unfavorable verdict were reversed and rendered in [the party’s] favor, [the party] would have lost the
benefit of a final judgment based on the first jury verdict without ever knowing why”)); In re Office
of the Attorney Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Reece, 341
S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (“mandamus is available to challenge an order of
contempt not involving confinement given the unavailability of the Court’s statutory habeas corpus
jurisdiction in that circumstance”)).
89. See Douglas S. Lang & Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the
Texas Supreme Court, 66 SMU L. REV. 1155 (2013).
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IV. OTHER MANDAMUS RELIEF
As described above, in addition to cases involving an alleged abuse of
discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal, mandamus proceedings may be
specifically authorized by statutes or rules. Such proceedings generally involve
challenges to acts of courts or public officers 90 and may be limited to
proceedings in the supreme court rather than the courts of appeals. 91 Further,
the relator’s burden in such cases generally consists of showing lack of
compliance with the statute or rule in question. 92 Two of the six published
opinions within the survey period involve proceedings of this type.
A. MANDAMUS AND CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS AMOUNTS
In the case of In re Nalle Plastics, 93 the supreme court addressed an issue of
first impression pertaining to whether attorney’s fees awarded in a judgment
constitute compensatory damages for purposes of calculating a supersedeas
bond. 94 The case involved a breach of contract claim filed by a law firm, Porter,
Rogers, Dahlman, & Gordon, P.C. (Porter), against a former client, Nalle
90. See, e.g., In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding).
91. See, e.g., id. (“Only the supreme court may issue writ of mandamus against an officer of the
executive department of this state.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a) (a party may seek supreme court
mandamus review of a court of appeals’ ruling on a motion respecting amount of security required
to supersede execution of judgment).
92. See, e.g., Simmons v. Kuznich, 166 S.W.3d 342, 348 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, orig.
proceeding).
93. In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 169 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
94. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a), which addresses appellate review of rulings respecting the
security required to supersede a judgment. That rule provides in part:
A party may seek review of the trial court’s ruling by motion filed in the court of
appeals with jurisdiction or potential jurisdiction over the appeal from the judgment
in the case. A party may seek review of the court of appeals’ ruling on the motion by
petition for writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court.
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Plastics Family Limited Partnership (Nalle), for alleged failure to pay legal fees.95
A jury found that Nalle breached its agreement with Porter, resulting in
$132,661 in damages, and that $150,000 was a reasonable attorney’s fee for the
necessary services of Porter’s attorneys in collecting the amount Nalle owed. 96
The trial court signed a judgment awarding Porter those amounts. In order to
suspend enforcement of the judgment pending appeal, Nalle made a deposit
with the trial court that included the $132,661 in breach of contract damages
plus interest and costs of court. 97 “Porter complained that the judgment had not
been properly superseded because Nalle’s deposit did not include attorney’s
fees.” 98 The trial court agreed and ordered Nalle to supplement the deposit to
cover the fee award. 99 After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain relief by motion
in the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi-Edinburg, Nalle deposited
the additional amount and filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the supreme
court.100
The supreme court observed that the amount required to supersede a
judgment must be “‘equal [to] the sum of . . . the amount of compensatory
damages awarded in the judgment[,] . . . interest for the estimated duration of
the appeal[,] and . . . costs awarded in the judgment.’” 101 Further, that court
stated that the courts of appeals were divided on the issue of whether attorney’s
fees should be considered either compensatory damages or costs when
calculating supersedeas amounts. 102 After discussion and analysis of the relevant
statutes and case law, the supreme court concluded “[i]f the underlying suit
concerns a claim for attorney’s fees as an element of damages, as with Porter’s
claim for unpaid fees here, then those fees may properly be included in a judge
or jury’s compensatory damages award.” 103 However, that court stated,
“attorney’s fees incurred in the prosecution or defense of a claim are not
compensatory damages.” 104 Additionally, that court concluded “costs awarded in
the judgment” does not include anything other than court costs. 105 The supreme
court conditionally granted the writ and directed the trial court to vacate its
order and refund any monies overpaid by Nalle. 106
B. MANDAMUS AND COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT
The case of In re Blair 107 involved a relator seeking compensation from the
Texas Comptroller for wrongful imprisonment pursuant to Chapter 103 of the
95. In re Nalle Plastics, 406 S.W.3d at 169.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a).
101. In re Nalle Plastics, 406 S.W.3d at 169 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
52.006(a) (West 2008)); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2.
102. In re Nalle Plastics, 406 S.W.3d at 170.
103. Id. at 175 (emphasis original).
104. Id. at 174.
105. Id. at 175.
106. Id. at 176.
107. In re Blair, 408 S.W.3d 843 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
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Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 108 In November 1988, Michael N.
Blair was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for burglary and indecency with
a child.109 He served eighteen months and was paroled in April 1990. 110 His
parole was revoked after he was arrested in September 1993 for the murder of a
child. Blair was convicted of that crime and sentenced to death. While Blair was
in prison awaiting execution, he was indicted for four counts of indecency with
a child committed in 1992 and 1993. Blair pleaded guilty to those charges in
2004 and received four life sentences, three consecutive and one concurrent. 111
In 2008, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “set aside Blair’s murder
conviction based on DNA evidence establishing his actual innocence.” 112 In
June 2009, while still serving his sentence pertaining to the 1992 and 1993
indecency with a child offenses, Blair applied to the Texas Comptroller pursuant
to Chapter 103 for more than $1 million in compensation “for having been
wrongfully incarcerated from 1993, when he was arrested for murder, to 2004,
when he was sentenced for the 1992–1993” indecency with a child offenses. 113
The comptroller denied Blair’s application because Blair was: (1) currently
incarcerated and “[t]he Legislature clearly intends [compensation under the Act]
to be provided only to eligible applicants in order that they might put their lives
back together after their release;” 114 and (2) incarcerated for another offense, the
2004 child molestation convictions, when he became eligible for compensation
in 2009. 115
Blair filed a petition for mandamus relief in the supreme court. 116 The
supreme court disagreed with the comptroller’s argument that Blair’s claim must
be rejected because it is inconsistent with purpose the of Chapter 103. 117 The
supreme court, however, stated “there is another difficulty with Blair’s claim.” 118
Specifically, the supreme court observed that section 103.154(a) of Chapter 103
provides in part that “compensation payments to a person . . . terminate if, after
the date the person becomes eligible for compensation . . . the person is
convicted of a crime punishable as a felony.” 119 The supreme court reasoned

108. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001–.154 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
Chapter 103 provides in part that in order to receive compensation from the State of Texas for
wrongful imprisonment, the claimant must file an application with the comptroller that meets the
requirements of the statute. Id. § 103.051(a). If the comptroller denies the claim, the claimant has
thirty days to submit an application to cure any problem identified. Id. § 103.051(d). “If the
comptroller denies a claim after the claimant submits an application under Subsection (d), the
claimant may bring an action for mandamus relief.” Id. § 103.051(e). The statute is silent as to the
claimant’s burden of proof respecting a mandamus action under Chapter 103.
109. In re Blair, 408 S.W.3d at 845.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 846.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.051(e) (following comptroller’s denial
of application for compensation for wrongful imprisonment, “claimant may bring action for
mandamus relief”).
117. In re Blair, 408 S.W.3d at 848.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 849.
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that the phrase “is convicted” in Section 103.154(a):
can reasonably be read to refer to the claimant’s status and not only the
moment guilt is adjudicated. Thus construed, the statute denies
compensation payments for wrongful imprisonment to a claimant who,
during the time he would receive them, is convicted of a felony, regardless
of when the conviction was adjudicated, whether before or after he became
eligible for compensation. 120
Accordingly, the supreme court concluded the comptroller properly denied
Blair’s claim for compensation, and denied Blair’s petition for writ of
mandamus.121
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of published Texas Supreme Court mandamus opinions
issued during the period of January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2013,
illustrates that mandamus remains an extraordinary remedy available only in
limited circumstances. 122 Further, as in past years, the majority of the published
mandamus opinions of the supreme court involve cases in which the relator’s
burden included showing lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. 123 While the
supreme court’s approach to that element varies from providing a specific
analysis to providing no analysis at all, the court continues to reach conclusions
that are consistent with cases involving similar fact situations. Accordingly, the
case law does not indicate any change to the established requirements that must
be satisfied in order to obtain mandamus relief.

120. Id.
121. Id. at 851.
122. For analysis of the supreme court’s treatment of the mandamus remedy prior to the survey
period of this article, see generally Lang & Campbell, supra note 89; Douglas S. Lang et al.,
Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 64 SMU L. REV. 393 (2011).
123. See generally Lang & Campbell, supra note 89; Lang et al., supra note 122.

